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LAW QUARTERLY

murrer to the bill might perhaps have been tendered in vacation,
still the issue raised by the demurrer could have been decided only
by the court in term. Granting the injunction over the objection of
the defendant was, in effect, tentative approval of the sufficiency
of the bill; but it was not a judicial determination of its sufficiency
as a legal proposition in pleading. To ask the Supreme Court to
pass upon the mere propriety of having granted the injunction was
to ask it to exercise a supervisory, not an appellate, jurisdiction;
to prejudge, rather than to review, the action of the lower court.
The defendant, however, had a remedy which was practically theequivalent of a demurrer in vacation. The statute allows an appeal from an order overruling a motion to dissolve an injunction.
W. VA. CODE, c. 135, § 1. A motion to dissolve an injunction,
based on the bill alone and without an answer having been filed
to the bill, is the practical equivalent of a demurrer to the bill.
Hyre v. Hoover et al., 3 W. Va. 11 (1868). Even prior to the AcTs
of 1915, the defendant, having made a motion in vacation to dissolve the injunction, could have appealed immediately by the
regular process of appeal from an adverse ruling of the court
thereon, and appellate relief would have been granted. The absence of an answer would have eliminated any question of fact, thus
casting the decision upon a pure question of law as involving the
sufficiency of the allegations of the bill. All this is assuming, of
course, that the defendant is the party seeking appellate relief.
DEEDS--ACKNOWLEDGMENT-HuSBAND
AND WIF.-A husband
held the legal title to land in trust for the use and benefit of his
wife. The husband and wife, in the same deed, but with no description either in the deed or in the certificate of acknowledgment
showing the relationship of husband and wife, conveyed the land
to a third party. Held, (Poffenbarger, J., dissenting), that the
deed and acknowledgment were sufficient. Wehrle v. Price et al.,
94 S. E. 477 (W. Va. 1917).
At common law, a married woman could not convey her real
property by grant. Rosenour v. Rosenour, 47 W. Va. 554, 35 S. E.
918 (1900) ; Ogle v. Adams, 12 W. Va. 213, 240 (1877). She was
divested of her title, if at all, by fine or recovery. Shumate v.
Shumate, 78 W. Va. 576, 581, 90 S. E. 824 (1916). In West Virginia, her power to convey and the manner thereof are defined by
cc. 66 and 73, W. VA. CODE. Hence, her power to convey being
purely statutory, at least substantial compliance with the statute
is essential. Rosenour v. Rosenour, supra; Bennett v. Pierce, 45
W. Va. 654, 31 S. E. 972 (1898) ; Gillespie et ux v. Bailey et al., 12
W. Va. 70, 88 (1877) ; Watson v. Michael, 21 W. Va. 568 (1883).
Under the statute, failure of the husband to join in the conveyance
renders it void. Austin v. Brown, 37 W. Va. 634, 17 S. E. 207
(1893); Merritt v. Hughes, 36 W. Va. 356, 15 S. E. 56 (1892);
Cooey v. Porter,22 W. Va. 120 (1883). It is not sufficient that the
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wife and husband convey by two separate deeds, although identical
in form and substance. Cecil v. Clark, 44 W. Va. 659, 688-9, 30
S. E. 216 (1898). Although the husband and wife may acknowledge their signatures either jointly or separately, the husband must
have signed the deed before the wife has power to acknowledge.
Cecil v. Clark, supra. It is not essential, however, that he be
named in the body of the deed. Morgan v. Snodgrass, 49 W. Va.
387, 38 S. l.. 695 (1901). But the wife must be named on the face of
the deed aw a grantor. Lautghlin v. Fream, 14 W. Va. 322 (1878).
However, designating her in the body of the deed as "wife" of the
other grantor has been held sufficient. Hill v. Horse Creek Coal
Land Co., 70 W. Va. 221, 73 S. E. 718 (1912). Acknowledgment by
the husband, as the final act of approval on his part, is essential.
Morgan et al. v. Snodgrass et al., supra. A married woman's deed,
even inter partes, is void, unless properly acknowledged by her.
Shumate v. Shumate, supra. In Virginia, recordation has also
been held essential, Borer v. Roanoke Bank, 83 Va. 589, 4 S. E.
820, but the rule is otherwise in West Virginia. Morgan et al v.
Snodgrass et al., supra. Even at common law, if the husband had
abjured the realm, or was an alien residing continuously abroad,
the wife became vested with the rights of a feme sole. The latter
rule, in the United States, has been applied as to residence in different states. Buford v. Adair et al., 43 W. Va. 211, 27 S. E. 260
(1897). In West Virginia, statutory provisions have been made
for the execution of deeds by married women living "separate and
apart" from their husbands, or whose husbands are non compos
mentis. W. VA. CODE:, c. 73, § 6. It has been held that the certificate of acknowledgment of the wife so living separate and apart
from her husband must contain as recitals all the prerequisites
enumerated by the statute. Bennett v. Pierce, supra. Otherwise,
the deed is void. But a later ease holds that, although the instrument is not a deed on account of such defect in the acknowledgment, still it is a valid executory contract passing equitable title,
and, hence, is not void. Shumate v. Shumate, supra. The principal case holds that neither in the deed nor in the certificate of
acknowledgment is it necessary that the grantors be described as
husband and wife; holding, in effect, that such fact may be shown
by parol evidence. The only instance wherein the court has heretofore directly discussed this point is at least a direct intimation
to the contrary of the doctrine established by the principal case.
Morgan et al. v. Snodgrass et al., supra, citing Merritt v. Yates, 71
Ill. 636, 23 Am. Rep. 128 (1874). Regardless of the practical result reached in the principal case, the statutory construction and
legal principles involved would seem to support the contention of
the dissenting opinion. Mere joint grantors, not related as husband and wife, can, and do, acknowledge by the form of certificate
provided in W. VA. CODE, c. 73, § 3. It would seem, if there is any
additional substance at all (and there must be, or the legislative
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intention is futile) in § 4, it can be only in the description of the
relationship of husband and wife. Such is the reasoning of the
dissenting opinion. And it may be added that in Cecil v. Clark,
supra, the very form of the certificate was directly relied upon
as dictating its essentials.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS--POLICE

POWER-HEIGHT

OF

BUILD-

INGs.-Under a charter authorization to regulate the height of new
buildings, the defendant city refused a permit to relator to build a
one story building on his lot in the business section. Held, that the
city's policy to prevent erection of buildings less than three stories
high in that section camot be justified under its police power.
Slate, ex rel. Sale v. Stahlman, 94 S. E. 497 (W. Va. 1917).
There seems to be no doubt that a municipality under the police
power may impose reasonable regulations as to the height and construction of buildings so long as such regulations tend to promote
the health or safety of its inhabitants. Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass.
364. 79 N. E. 745, affirmed ill 214 U. S. 91, 105 (1908); Charleston
v. Reed, 27 W. Va. 681, 55 Am. Rep. 336 (1886); Fellows v.
Charleston. 62 W. Va. 665, 59 S. E. 623, 125 Am. St. Rep. 990,
13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 737 (1907); see DILLON, MuNiciPAL CORPORATIONS, 5 ed., §696. In the principal case the court points out that
the requirement of a height of three stories does not have, as was
claimed, "any reasonable or substantial tendency to promote
safety," but might only be supported by aesthetic, civic, or economic views which are generally regarded as outside the scope of
the police power. See DILLON, supra, §695; Bostock v. Sams,
95 Md. 400, 52 Atl. 665 (1902) ; Commonwealth v. Boston Adv. Co.,
188 Mass. 348, 74 N. E. 601 (1905) ; Fruth v. Board of Affairs,
75 W. Va. 456, 463-5, 84 S. E. 105 (1915). In the latter case the
court declared an ordinance of the city of Charleston providing
for a building line invalid and such seems to be the weight of
authority in this country. Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137
(1912) ; see THE BAR, June, 1915, p. 40. Symmetry and beauty
in buildings have generally been attained only by the exercise of
the power of eminent domain or by private building restrictions,
though a tendency to secure aesthetic purposes under the police
power would seem to be evidenced by the alacrity with which various courts have abated bill boards as nuisances. See Cusack Co. v.
Chicago, 267 Ill. 344, 108 N. E. 340 (1914) ; 10 ILL. L. REv. 304.
While it is true that unsightliness is usually not so offensive as
noises or stenches, it is difficult to perceive the distinction which
the courts generally draw between them, especially since the din
and stench at times arise from the conduct of important industries
and are often not detrimental to the health of the community. See
FREUND, POLICE POWER, §182; Larremore, "Public Aesthetics," 20
HARV. L. REV. 35.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1918

3

